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UN-BASED INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:

How THEY MIX AND MATCH
MYREs S. McDOUGAL LECTURE

University of Denver Sturm College of Law
March 10, 2007
LARRY D. JOHNSON*

I. INTRODUCTION

Myres McDougal was a great American lawyer, professor and conceptual
engineer, building a bridge between private and public law and constructing the
great New Haven school of legal theory based on "public order and values." He
was distinctive, even among sociologically oriented colleagues in jurisprudence, in
insisting on detailed attention to social and power processes. Although I never had
the pleasure of studying under Professor McDougal (or "Mac" as he was known) I
was among his many admirers. I am deeply honoured to have been asked by the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law and my very good friend, Professor
Ved Nanda to deliver this lecture in honour of Mac.
This lecture is not intended to be on Mac's theories and jurisprudence, a task
clearly beyond the time allowed and more to the point, beyond my own
capabilities. Rather, I intend to discuss one aspect of international criminal lawthe development of United Nations-based international criminal tribunals, to be
exact. But before embarking on that, let me mention just a few phrases or concepts
which I believe are found in Mac's approach.**
For Mac, law was not a body of rules but was a process of making decisions
about how values-power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection,
respect and rectitude-are to be produced and distributed in a given community.
The role of the lawyer, as advocate or decision-maker, was to influence the process
in order to achieve the desired results. The goals of this process are those of a
public order of human dignity. The concept of community needs to be viewed in a

* Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, United Nations. The views expressed in this lecture are
those of the speaker alone and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations nor of its Office
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"McDougal, Myres S." in InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences, BiographicalSupplement,
vol. 18, p. 479 (1979).
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globally comprehensive and interdependent manner, with effective power
processes incorporated. Law is conceived as processes of authoritative decision by
which people clarify and implement their common interests, incorporating both
authority and control. In the field of international law, goals should be postulated
to guide decision-makers if community responses are to contribute to a public
order of human dignity. Perhaps some of these phrases or elements may be
instructive as we now proceed to the subject at hand.
When examining United Nations (UN)-based international criminal tribunals,
it is most important from the outset to note how recent this remarkable
development has been. Fifteen years ago, no such tribunals existed. The
establishment of such institutions has occurred rapidly and is one of the most
exciting and hopeful reaffirmations that the progressive development of
international law is very much alive and that the search for human dignity as been
advanced. It would have been inconceivable just a few years ago that a tribunal of
international judges--or mixed international/domestic judges--could by some
action under international law (UN resolution or treaty) have the authority to
prosecute individuals for crimes and sentence the guilty to imprisonment.
I will not discuss the International Criminal Court (ICC), the tribunal
established by universal multilateral treaty, nor the "Sarajevo War Crimes
Chamber," a non-UN domestic court but with international judges. I will also not
discuss war crimes prosecutions or courts established as part of a UN temporary
administration of territory such as in East Timor and Kosovo. Rather, I will
examine the international criminal tribunals established under UN auspices for the
former Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2002), Cambodia (2003)
and Lebanon (2007). Rather than taking them one by one, let us re-group under
headings to highlight their similarities and differences: a) broad goals; b) legal
basis; c) applicable law/jurisdiction; d) composition and location; e) financing; and
f) effectiveness. This presentation, given time and length constraints, can only be
somewhat superficial and deal with matters in a "broad stroke" manner.
II. BROAD GOALS
In terms of broad goals, here all the tribunals share the same community
values and goals: accountability for heinous crimes, no impunity for those who
commit them and, hopefully, through that process contribute to peace and
reconciliation in the community concerned.
III.

LEGAL BASIS

It is on the legal basis of the tribunals that the differences begin. The first two
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are subsidiary organs of the Security
Council, established by the Council under its Chapter VII enforcement powers.
They are thus "imposed" as it were---obligations were created by the Council
which bind all States, including that of complying with orders of the Tribunals.
The first tribunal, for the former Yugoslavia, was set up during the conflict in
1993, when the thrust was providing a deterrent to further violations of
international humanitarian law and providing a mechanism to bring to justice those
who allegedly committed such crimes; there was little talk of reconciliation as the
war was still raging in the Balkans. These two tribunals have "power" bases which
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the other tribunals lack: the Council could, in the appropriate circumstances, adopt
enforcement measures (such as imposing sanctions) against States which do not
comply with tribunal orders or judgments. Although the Yugoslav tribunal has
reported non-compliance to the Council on a number of occasions, no sanctions
have ever been imposed by the Council on States based on those reports. From
Mac's point of view, what would be interesting is to examine the effective use of
power (or political pressure) to achieve the desired community result in another
way: so-called "conditionality" of membership of Balkan States in NATO and the
EU. Those two organizations made the commencement of steps towards
membership of former Yugoslav countries conditional on full cooperation on the
part of the country concerned with the tribunal, including good faith efforts to
arrest fugitives and turn them over to the tribunal. Quite a number of fugitives
were turned over or "voluntarily surrendered" to the tribunal, so that very few
fugitives are left, although the two notorious ones-Mladic and Karadzic-are still
at large.
For the Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals, while the genesis for their
creation emanated from the Security Council for the former and the General
Assembly for the latter, their legal basis is not a decision of a UN body, but rather
a bilateral treaty between the UN and the country concerned. Thus these tribunals
were not "imposed" but rather exist at the request and with the consent of the
States concerned. There are no enforcement powers for these tribunals outside the
States concerned. While the Lebanon tribunal was modeled on the Sierra Leone
example, because of internal political difficulties the bilateral agreement between
the UN and the Government was not put before Lebanon's Parliament for
ratification. Acting on the request of the Government of Lebanon, the Security
Council under Chapter VII decided that the agreement would enter into force on a
certain date if the Parliament had not acted by that date. Thus, while clearly a
tribunal created at the request and with the consent of the Government of Lebanon,
the actual agreement establishing the tribunal was put into effect by virtue of a
binding decision of the Council.
Please note that the legal basis or method of establishment is directly related
to the accountability of the tribunals for their work. For the two Council tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they must report periodically to the
Security Council and the General Assembly on their work, the former as the parent
organ often giving policy and management direction to the two tribunals. For the
Sierra Leone and Lebanon tribunals, however, there is no reporting to any organ of
the United Nations. For the Cambodia tribunal, the Secretary-General reports to
the General Assembly on its progress of work.
IV. APPLICABLE LAW/ JURISDICTION

The former Yugoslav tribunal is a direct descendant of the Nuremburg
tribunals, covering war crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.
These crimes are often referred to as the "core crimes." The Rwanda tribunal
statute focused on crimes committed in internal armed conflict. In the case of the
Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals, they both included in the applicable law the
core crimes (except for the Sierra Leone tribunal which did not cover genocide)
but added other crimes more domestic in nature to take into account the particular
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situation of the country concerned. For example, the Sierra Leone tribunal had in
its subject matter jurisdiction recruitment of child soldiers and cruelty to children;
the Cambodia tribunal included torture and religious prosecution. A further
difference may be noted here: while the Sierra Leone tribunal is independent and
not linked to the domestic judicial system, the Cambodia tribunal is part of the
Cambodian domestic judicial system. Nonetheless, in both cases the tribunal is to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness
and due process of law.
The Lebanon tribunal is radically different from the others: there are no
international crimes involved, at least on its face. While it is a tribunal of an
international character (see below), the crimes in its jurisdiction all flow from the
Lebanese Penal Code and relate to terrorist attacks and assassinations. Whether
the jurisprudence of this future tribunal will advance the argument that
international terrorism is an international crime outside a given treaty context
remains to be seen.
The applicable procedural law of the four "war crimes" tribunals is fairly
similar and is based on the international standards of justice and due process
inspired by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Lebanese
tribunal, being a tribunal applying the domestic law of Lebanon, will have to adopt
its rules of procedure and evidence in the light of the Lebanese Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such rules will also have to reflect international standards of justice
and due process.
V. COMPOSITION AND LOCATION

For the two Security Council ("ad hoc") tribunals-for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda-all the judges are international and no national judges serve. Those
two tribunals, it may be recalled, were Council enforcement measures. For the
Sierra Leone and Lebanese tribunals, the majority of judges are international with
a minority of judges being national judges. In the case of Cambodia, the situation
changes. The majority ofjudges are national with the international judges being in
the minority. But to guard against a purely "national" decision, no decision can be
taken by a chamber unless at least one international judge joins the majority of
national judges. The "dual" nature of this tribunal is further seen in the fact that
there are both UN and national "co-prosecutors" and "investigative judges" and
two sides to the staff-a Cambodian side where staff are hired by the Government
and the "UN" side hired as UN staff. This has created a complicated and
challenging structure.
On location, for the Yugoslav tribunal there was no question that it would
obviously have to be located outside the region as it was in flames at the time of
the tribunal's establishment. Thus The Hague was selected as it was already the
site of the principal judicial organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice.
For Rwanda the tribunal was established shortly after the end of internal conflict.
It was thought best for a variety of reasons to locate the tribunal outside the
country, in this case in Arusha, Tanzania, but with an office in Kigali. In both
cases, commentators have noted that placing the tribunals some distance outside
the country where the crimes occurred goes against the usual criminal law tenet
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that trials should normally be held where the crime occurred, where the evidence
can be found and where the witnesses can be located. The local population can
attend the trials and see that justice is indeed being done; they feel they are
participating in the process. Certainly in the former Yugoslavia, there is a feeling
of resentment by various segments of the population that the tribunal's work has
not been impartial, targeting some ethnic groups while leaving others untouched.
Partly as a reaction to this, in both the cases of Sierra Leone and Cambodia
the tribunals were located in the affected countries themselves, to engage the
population and local authorities in the international justice system and to facilitate
national peace and reconciliation. The results for the Sierra Leone tribunal have
been very positive, with highly successful and popular "outreach" programmes
reaching remote towns and villages. But even in Sierra Leone, the sensitive nature
of a defendant can affect the location of the trial. At the request of the leaders of
countries in West Africa, the trial of Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leone tribunal is
being held in The Hague, not in Freetown, the site of the tribunal. The trial of the
ex-President of Liberia in near-by Sierra Leone with Taylor supporters still active
in both countries would have risked instability in the region. In Cambodia, the
trials have yet to begin but the fact of "embedding" the tribunal in the Cambodian
judicial system and providing for a split national/international structure has
allegedly undermined international justice. The Open Society Initiative has
alleged that corruption, kickbacks and improper hiring procedures occurred on the
Cambodian side of the tribunal. Obviously if such practices are condoned,
international standards of justice and due process would be undermined and its
proceedings could be fatally contaminated. Audits have been conducted and
measures put in place to prevent such practices. Whether investigations of past
allegations of corruption need to be conducted is a matter for consideration.
For the Lebanon tribunal, the divisions and tensions among the various groups
in Lebanon-sometimes leading to violence and assassinations-made it
implausible to consider establishing the tribunal in Beirut. It will be located in The
Hague with an office in Beirut.
VI. FINANCING
For the two Security Council tribunals for the former Yugoslav and Rwanda,
as they are subsidiary bodies of the Council reporting to it, they are part of the
established programme of activities of the United Nations. Their expenses are
assessed and allocated among all the Member States of the Organization as decided
by the relevant budgetary bodies of the General Assembly.
For the other three tribunals, they are financed from voluntary contributions
of Member States and not from the budget of the United Nations. At the time of
establishing the Sierra Leone tribunal, major contributors to the budget of the UN
Pelt that the two Council criminal tribunals had grown too large and too expensive;
the new one should be funded from voluntary contributions from States and closely
monitored by the donors. The then Secretary-General and Legal Counsel resisted
that approach, noting that justice cannot be subject to the availability of funds
which could "dry up" at any time in the middle of a trial or when an accused is
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awaiting trial. Power and allocation of resources won the day: that tribunal as well
as the subsequent UN-based tribunals are funded by voluntary contributions.
For the Sierra Leone tribunal, the money did in fact run out at one point, and
the General Assembly, as an exception and for one time only, gave a "subvention"
or loan to the tribunal so that it could continue functioning. The Cambodian
tribunal has difficulty in raising funds. The Lebanon tribunal is just in the course
of being established and is still collecting the required funds and pledges in order
to begin functioning. It is interesting to note that for that tribunal a special
contribution formula was chosen: the Lebanese Government contributes 49% of
the expenses and other States contribute 51% of the expenses.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness involves matters of power, achieving goals and advancing
shared community values. If you ask the detainees waiting trial or those serving
time in prison as a result of tribunal convictions, chances are they would consider
the tribunals highly effective-they have lost their liberty. In the Yugoslav
tribunal alone, over 100 persons have been tried and almost 50 are or have been
sentenced to serve time in prison.
Some commentators claim that the tribunals have not been effective since
they have not achieved the goal of peace and reconciliation. But was that the goal
of the tribunals? Or was it to prosecute, as in any other criminal court, those
accused of heinous crimes in accordance with the law and standards of due
process? The influence of human rights and the rights of victims has entered the
policy goals of these tribunals which are different or absent from trials on the
domestic level. Here, the prosecutor represents the victims and intemational
community and wants to prove as much as can possibly be proven, to show the
monstrosity and enormity of the crimes the individual is charged with having
committed-not just what is needed for a successful conviction (more or less the
usual domestic goal). Rather, the prosecutorial policy includes showing and
proving to the world, to the victims and to the affected population, all the
international crimes the person allegedly committed. This means complicated and
thus lengthy trials with many witnesses and pieces of evidence. The tensions
between the goal of representing the interests of the victims and the goal of
financial restraint and speedy trials are evident. Some say the tribunals also have
an important role to play in getting the historical record straight to avoid future
denials and facilitating reconciliation, while others would say that is not the
function of a court of law. Finally, it must be pointed out that proving the elements
of core crimes (such as a "widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population") may require more evidence and testimony than that of a domestic
murder prosecution.
Each tribunal faces its own challenges of effectiveness depending on its own
circumstances and political/social context: the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals
have to begin winding down as they are searching for the final fugitives and
grappling with populations and Governments in their affected regions not
necessarily supportive; for the Sierra Leone tribunal, judgments will soon begin to
be announced, some of which might not prove popular; for the Cambodia tribunal,
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the first trials will be a test of the application of international standards by a
tribunal "embedded" in a country's national system; and for the Lebanon tribunal
the challenge is to be established and function in a volatile environment, where
violence and assassination, including against tribunal judges and officials, will be a
constant risk.
On the core value or purposes, however, there can be little doubt: the tribunals
and their jurisprudence have advanced the cause of promoting and protecting the
human dignity of the individual against crimes of the worst order on the
international level. Accountability and no impunity have been the driving forces
behind all these tribunals, with peace and reconciliation part of the process. The
tribunals will leave behind a powerful and effective legacy for the ICC.
As to power to enforce and achieving truth and reconciliation, the report card
is mixed depending on the tribunal concerned and its particular mandate and ability
to bring about goals sought. How much consensus is needed in the relevant
community in order to succeed is, again, a matter for each individual tribunal.
Each one was established and operates in its own social/political/legal context;
each must be judged within its own context. Under this umbrella one can find
various intersecting interests and policies: differences between civil and common
law approaches; truth and reconciliation processes compared to judicial
mechanisms; peace negotiations alongside no impunity for committing core
crimes; and local community values compared with universal community values.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Summing up, no single "legal" mold fits all. The success and study of each
tribunal will have to be judged on its own in its own context. But I think there is
no doubt that the experiment begun 15 years ago was overall a success and more
than worth it. The establishment of these UN-based tribunals, while some would
criticize as being examples of "selective justice," nonetheless proved to the world
that at least in some cases, heinous acts by individuals would not go unnoticed by
the larger community and that legal mechanisms would be established to try the
accused and deliver justice. There would be accountability and no impunity for
those found guilty of committing the worst of crimes. Even though Milosevic died
before his trial was over and thus was never technically found "guilty" by the
tribunal, I do not view that a failure. The fact remains he was in detention when he
died, on trial by an international mechanism for crimes he allegedly committed
against thousands of people. He did not die in a palace in Belgrade; he did not die
while at the Casino on the Riviera. An international criminal justice system was
operating against a former Head of State. Frankly, 15 years ago that would have
been beyond almost anyone's imagination.
I believe that the story of the UN-based criminal tribunals show that when the
constellation of the various factors and elements are right, a "public order of
human dignity" can be achieved.

